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Quinn Hiroshi Gibson, Dept. of Philosophy, Clemson University—Subjects with monothematic delusions believe apparently incredible things, e.g., that they are dead or that their spouses have been replaced by impostors or aliens. The cognitive science of these delusions is highly developed and yields convincing models of delusional belief formation, many of which are grounded in altered experiences delusional subjects are thought to have.

But the science leaves a number of central philosophical questions unanswered, in particular: Is the delusional subject’s belief formation process rational? What is the relation between the altered experience and the content of the delusion? Are such altered experiences necessary for delusional belief? Are they sufficient?

In this talk, I explore these questions with reference to the recent philosophical literature on delusions. I suggest that theorists have over-rationalized delusions because they have overlooked the forms of non-rational but intelligible thought to which we can appeal in order to make sense of delusional cognition.